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During the initial stage of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), known as the 
blowdown phase, the high-temperature and pressure break flow can impinge on thermal 
insulation and generate a substantial amount of debris in containment.  This debris can 
accumulate in the sump compartment and become a major safety concern by potentially 
impacting the capabilities of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS).  Debris can 
accumulate in the sump and could cause ECCS pump head loss and/or pass through the 
filtering systems (debris bed and sump strainer) into the reactor primary system during the 
long-term cooling phase.  This scenario and its possible downstream effects are of primary 
concern under the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Generic Safety Issue 191 
(GSI-191). 
If the debris was to bypass the filtering and accumulate at the core inlet, core flow 
could theoretically decrease, affecting the core coolability (decay heat removal).  If the 
debris accumulation at the lower core plate was high enough, it could potentially block 
the flow through the base of the core, the primary coolant flow path. In an even more 
severe scenario, debris could block all flow from the bottom of the core by blocking both 
the core inlet and core baffle/barrel bypass.  
Under such conditions, core coolability is dependent on coolant reaching the core 
through alternative flow paths. One of these key flow paths is the core bypass 
(baffle/barrel).   Additionally, the effectiveness of bypass flow in reaching and cooling the 
core is heavily impacted by certain plant specific features.  One such plant specific feature, 
which the presence or lack of can have a major impact on core coolability, are the pressure 
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relief (LOCA) holes.  When the core inlet and bypass are unavailable, coolant must reach 
the core from the top by passing through the upper head region or steam generators. 
The primary response during each phase of a double-end guillotine (DEG) Loss-
of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) was analyzed for the model of a typical 4-loop Pressurized 
Water Reactor (PWR) using RELAP5-3D.  The effectiveness of core cooling under the 
hypothesized cold leg break with full core inlet blockage was analyzed for models with 
and without pressure relief holes.  Core cooling was also evaluated under a hypothesized 
hot leg DEG break with full core inlet and core bypass blockages, with particular emphasis 
on comparing simplified upper head geometry to a more realistic and more conservative 
model. 
The results of the cold leg break with inlet blockage simulation showed that the 
presence of alternative flow paths from the bypass into the core may significantly increase 
core coolability and prevent cladding temperatures from reaching safety limits, while the 
lack of LOCA holes may lead to a conservative over-prediction of the cladding 
temperature.  The simulation results also showed the impact of LOCA holes on total liquid 
level maintained in the core and driving flow through the bypass.  The hot leg full 
inlet/bypass blockage showed that the upper head path was able to provide sufficient 
coolant, even under conservative models. These simulation results help inform safety 
impacts of some severe accidents under GSI-191 and serve as a reminder of the importance 
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In the United States, civilian applications of nuclear technology fall under the 
oversight of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an independent agency created 
“to ensure the safe use of radioactive materials for beneficial civilian purposes while 
protecting people and the environment.” [1]  As part of its regulatory duties, the NRC 
often identifies potential issues that could affect the safety of nuclear power plants. Often, 
these fall under the purview of the Generic Issues Program [2] if they “could affect 
multiple entities under NRC jurisdiction.” Typically, NRC attention to these potential 
issues are motivated by incidents that occurred at a single power plant and could 
potentially affect many other plants with similar components. 
The potential for one such Generic Safety Issue (GSI), related to potential loss of 
sump pumping power, or Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH), due to possible debris 
accumulation on the sump pump strainer after a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) was 
theorized by the NRC in 1985. In 1992, an incident occurred at the Barsebäck Boiling 
Water Reactor (BWR) Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Sweden. A LOCA occurred at a 
safety release valve, causing a hot steam jet to impinge and dislodge insulation, which was 
transported to the condensation pool in the lower part of containment. Once recirculation 
occurred and the pumps began to draw water from the pool, a pressure drop alarm was 
triggered by cavitation which had occurred in the containment spray system pumps. It was 
determined that the problem was due to the clogging at the strainer due to its small surface 
area. A year later, a US BWR, Perry NPP had similar issues with strainers being blocked 
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by particulate matter and later fiberglass insulation. These events prompted the NRC to 
issue a bulletin to BWR licensees mandating they address this potential problem. [3] 
The primary solution to this issue was rather simple for BWRs. Enlarging the 
strainer surface area and removing or replacing fibrous insulation not rated to withstand 
LOCA conditions addressed the concerns for the vast majority of BWR plants.  Despite 
not occurring at any Pressurizer Water Reactors (PWRs), the NRC determined they should 
also address this potential event. PWRs did not have such a simple fix due to a number of 
factors, including differences in design of BWR suppression pools compared to PWR 
sump pools, so the NRC opened GSI-191 to address this scenario. [3] 
A risk-informed approach was determined to be the best method of addressing 
GSI-191 in PWRs. A risk-informed approach utilizes insights from probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) in conjunction with other engineering insights to determine the actual 
risk to core damage. [4] For example, the location and size of break can have a widely 
varied effect on the amount of debris generated during a LOCA. Additionally, some debris 
may bypass the strainer and could therefore impact the primary system. Texas A&M has 
performed numerous debris distribution and penetration studies, as well as computational 
thermal hydraulic analyses in support of these possible scenarios. [5] Following this train 
of logic, if sufficient debris were to penetrate the sump strainer and enter the primary 
system, it could theoretically accumulate at small flow area flow paths, and possibly affect 
core coolability. These are generically referred to as “downstream effects.”  
One such major region of concern for a downstream flow blockage effect is the 
core inlet. This is theoretically possible because of the filter system at the base of fuel 
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assemblies, consisting of a debris filter and a Protective-Grid (P-Grid). [6]  During normal 
operation, greater than 90% of coolant flow follows the flow path through the base of fuel 
assemblies, as illustrated in Figure 1-1. When a break occurs, this is still the predominant 
flow path for coolant to reach the core, so if debris were to pass through the sump strainers, 
it would likely be transported to the core inlet. 
 
 




If debris were to sufficiently accumulate in this region, it could block coolant flow 




become essential to maintaining core coolability. Additionally, if the bypass and core were 
both simultaneously blocked due to excessive debris accumulation, the available 
alternative flow path for coolant is more severely impacted. Additionally, a number of 
plant specific features, such as pressure relief (“LOCA”) holes (between the bypass and 
core) may play an important role in ensuring core coolability. 
This study intends to examine the possible safety impacts of debris blockage 
during a large break loss-of-coolant accident. As a possible scenario relevant to GSI-191, 
this analysis supports closure as the general procedure can be applied to multiple units.  
Using RELAP5 to model the primary system and each stage of the accident, the 
consequences of both a CL DEG with core inlet blockage and HL DEG with full core and 
bypass blockage can be evaluated for a generic Westinghouse four-loop PWR.  Because 
the analysis focuses on the impact of specific alternative flow paths for each break, the 
plant specific design could have a great deal of impact on the final results. For example, 
the presence or lack of LOCA holes, or the design of the upper support plate and guide 
tubes may vary and cause much different results for otherwise identical breaks. Therefore, 
it is more useful to look at the more severe bounding cases as done in this study. The 
model can then be refined to match an exact plant unit and a specific analysis. It is 
expected that this methodology, while somewhat conservative in this instance, provide 





2. OVERVIEW OF COOLANT FLOW PATHS 
If debris is transported to the primary system, it is possible for it to accumulate in 
the reactor vessel and cause core blockage. In order to determine the degree of blockage, 
the nominal flow paths through the primary vessel must be considered.  Figure 2-1 
displays these flow paths extensively. Table 2-1 explains the labelling of each flow path 
and key potential blockage location as well as showing the corresponding fraction of flow. 
The flow from the downcomer (A) is further subdivided (D-H) as noted (they sum to the 
flow of A). These values are approximate for a Westinghouse 4-Loop PWR, but may vary 
(especially with respect to designed upper head flow). [8] This is due to subsequent 
modifications to upper head flow in many plants to compensate for Primary Water Stress 
Cracking Corrosion (PWSCC) in the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM), increasing 
the upper head flow from the cold leg by approximately two percent directly diverted from 
the downcomer (originally destined for direct fuel contact heat removal). [9]  The model 
simulated in this thesis will assume these modifications.  Table 2-2 describes the structural 
components of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) with flow through them that are 
relevant to this study. Further functional and structural description available in [8] and [9]. 





















of Total Flow 
(%)2 
Description 
A 96.5% to 98.5% Downcomer to lower plenum to core region flow 
B <1% 
Hot leg/cold keg designed leakage (nozzle bypass 
flow) 
C 1-2.5% Upper head spray and instrumentation cooling 
D (A) 91.5% to 93.5% Heat removal by direct contact with fuel 
E (A) 2% 
Empty guide tube and instrumentation rods (without 
thimble plugs in many updated designs) 
F (A) 2% 
Control rod and in-core instrumentation cooling (via 
guide tubes) 
G (A) 0.5% Gap between outer fuel assemblies and baffle 




1 – The parenthetical letter indicates which primary flow path the sub components are part 
of. IE, the flow paths D-H all originate from the downcomer flow and as such sum to equal 
that percentage of total flow. 
 
2 – These values are approximate, and while given as a range, vary from plant to plant, 
therefore some plants may exceed or may not meet these given values.  
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Table 2-2. Key Structural Locations 
 









and then back up 
from lower 
plenum region) 
Primarily structural. Large penetrations for flow 
and instrumentation thimbles.  




All A  
Perforated plate between Lower Core Plate and 
Bottom Support Plate Creates uniform coolant 
flow to fuel assemblies. Not used in all 
Westinghouse units. 
(3) Lower Core 
Plate 
A to D/E/F/G/H 
Structurally supports and positions fuel 
assemblies. Distribute coolant flow to core, 








G to H (through 
LOCA holes) 
Core bypass region. If available, LOCA holes 
are located along the vertical baffle plates. 
Secured to core barrel by horizontal former 
plates.  




Aligns upper and lower core support structure, 
fuel assemblies, and control rods. Typically, 
coolant flows up from the core, and radially out 
through the outlet nozzles (hot legs). 
(7) Upper 
Support Plate 
C, through spray 
nozzles (Cold 
Leg to Upper 
Head) and 
through control 
rod guide tubes 
(Upper Head to 
Upper Plenum)   
Primarily for attachment for other upper 
internals (support columns and control rod guide 
tubes) through designed perforations. Serves as 
dividing boundary between upper plenum and 
reactor vessel head. Structural design varies in 
Westinghouse RPVs, but purpose and flow path 
is generally the same. May have additional 
perforations between head and plenum, but these 
are not included in this study for conservatism. 
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3. POSTULATED BLOCKAGES AND IMPACT ON FLOW PATHS
Once the nominal coolant flow paths are understood, plausible accident scenarios 
under GSI-191 can be postulated and their consequences can be estimated through 
simulations.  
3.1 Postulated Core Inlet Blockage Scenario 
During a LOCA a substantial amount of debris may be generated in containment 
during the blowdown phase.  This stage of the accident could generate debris because the 
hot water jet from the break could spray onto piping insulation, breaking it down into 
fibrous debris. This debris can then be transported to the containment floor by break flow 
or containment cooling spray. This is demonstrated in Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2. [10] 
 
 






Figure 3-2. Depiction of Containment Cooling Spray [10] 
 
Initially, the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) draws water from the 
Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). All this time, injected water eventually flows out 
of the break and travels by gravity to the lower containment. When the RWST reaches a 
very low level, the sump switchover (SSO) is engaged and water is drawn for recirculation 
from the sump pump in the lower containment.  These pumps have large strainers designed 
to prevent debris penetration into the primary system, such as those pictured in Figure 3-3. 
Debris beds tend to form on the strainers and prevent further penetration into the primary 
system, however, fine debris may penetrate the strainers, especially immediately after 
SSO. The initial postulated accident was a loss of NPSH on these strainers due to 
significant debris bed, therefore many plants increased the surface area of their strainers. 




Figure 3-3. Example Sump Strainer  [12] 
 
 In the case that debris does enter the primary system, the most likely transport 
path is through the downcomer. The debris is then most likely to accumulate at the base 
of fuel assemblies due to the design of the debris filter and P-Grid. If the debris were to 
sufficiently accumulate at the core inlet region, the core flow could theoretically decrease, 
affecting the core coolability. Figure 3-4 shows the complexity of the filter system at the 
bottom of each assembly and why it is the most likely place for debris to accumulate in 










3.2 Baffle/Barrel Bypass Flow and Pressure Relief “LOCA” Holes 
Under such core inlet blockage conditions, the removal of decay heat would only 
be possible by coolant flow reaching the core through alternative flow paths, such as the 
barrel/baffle core bypass region (simply referred to as “bypass” in this study).  While the 
baffle could potentially be blocked by debris as well, as considered later, it has a larger 
and less restrictive flow area compared to the fuel assembly bases, therefore, considering 
it to be free may be reasonable given CL DEG debris generation and penetration estimates.    
There are certain plant specific features that can play a major role in core cooling from 
this bypass flow.  One of these of key interest is the pressure relief holes, also known as 
“LOCA holes.” In a typical PWR reactor vessel, LOCA holes exist in the baffle plates, 
enabling cross-flow between the core bypass and the core. These holes are arranged in 
rings symmetrically at discrete axial heights. 
During core inlet blockage in a design without LOCA holes, water must flow down 
the downcomer, up the bypass, then back into the core from the top. In a cold leg break, 
this process is primarily hydrostatically driven. Key heights are marked in Figure 3-5, 
where 1 is the cold leg inlet center, 2 is the core inlet/bypass entrance, 3 is the top of the 
core, and 4 are representative heights for possible LOCA holes. In a plant with LOCA 
holes, water does not need to reach the top of the core height before reaching the core from 




   
 




3.3 Full Core and Core Bypass Blockage 
In consideration of a more conservative blockage scenario, debris might block both 
the core inlet and the bypass. This is considered plausible when the baffle entrance or 
















3 top of core 





top of the 
guide tubes 
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inconsequential and coolant can only reach the core through alternative flow paths such 
as the hot leg/cold leg leakage or upper head sprays.  
3.4 Hot Leg/Cold Leg Leakage Flow  
During normal operation, a small amount of coolant passes directly between vessel 
inlet and outlet nozzles via the nozzle bypass flow. This coolant leakage passes through 
the “small clearances between the core barrel outlet nozzles and the reactor vessel outlet 
nozzles.” Due to the design of this leakage, credit is not taken for it in these scenarios. 
This is both plausible and conservative. It is plausible because the large frictional losses 
make this flow path least preferential, and small thermal swelling of the vessel could result 
in the clearance being reduced such that the pathway is closed. Additionally, it is more 
conservative to exclude this flow path from analysis because it provides near direct coolant 
access to the top of the core through the upper plenum. 
3.5 Upper Head Flow 
In order for flow to access the core from the upper head, it must first pass through 
the upper head sprays (height noted as 5 in Figure 3-5), flow through the top of the guide 
tubes (6), down into the upper plenum where it can flow into the core. Another key height 
for this alternative flow path region is the base of the Upper Support Plate (7). If the plate 
is perforated, coolant can bypass the guide tubes and directly access the upper plenum. If 
this is not the case, the coolant must fill up the head region to the height of the guide tubes 
before becoming available for core cooling. The conservative modelling methodology 
assumes no perforations exist for flow to pass directly through the upper support plate. 
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Another feature of note that varies from plant to plant is the specific design of the 
control rod guide tubes. The base of the tubes actually ends at the bottom of the upper core 
plate. In short, this could provide direct coolant access to the core once the upper head has 
sufficiently filled. However, some guide tubes are perforated in the upper plenum region, 
and thus flow could exit the tubes into the upper plenum after passing below the upper 
support plate. The conservative modelling methodology assumes perforations do exist for 




4. RELAP5 MODEL DESCRIPTION 
RELAP5-3D [14] was used to simulate the primary system. The primary system 
input model was based on a typical 4-loop Westinghouse PWR.  RELAP5-3D is a best-
estimate system code which has been used extensively for modelling primary systems in 
steady-state as well as responses of the primary systems during transients, including 
LOCA scenarios in LWRs. The code, developed by Idaho National Labs, has undergone 
a thorough validation process for LOCA scenarios and includes physical models for 
prediction of phenomena through all the phases of a LOCA, including blowdown, refill, 
reflood, and long-term cooling.  Beyond its thorough validation and being regarded well 
by the NRC and industry, RELAP5 was chosen because of its ability to model the entire 
primary system in sufficient detail, as well as model each scenario event, such as the break 
or blockage, in a single tool.  
The containment boundary data was obtained from relevant power plant simulator 
data of a typical large, dry containment simulation using MELCOR, imposing the 
boundary conditions at the break such as break flow and enthalpy supplied by the 
RELAP5-3D model.  MELCOR is a US NRC code which has been extensively used to 
perform calculation of the containment response during different types of accidents in 
LWRs, including LOCA. Containment data was imposed as a boundary condition for 
containment pressure and sump temperature in the RELAP5-3D model.  When using 
MELCOR with RELAP, this allowed the two models to pass data in a dynamic manner 
resulting in more realistic simulations.  Additional information about the MELCOR model 
is available in [15] and [11] and is not within the purview of this study. 
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4.1 Primary System Model 
The primary system, Figure 4-1, was modeled with one-dimensional components 
for these simulations.  All four coolant loops are independently modeled (as opposed to 
lumped modelling for non-break or non-pressurizer loops).  The non-pressurizer loops are 
2, 3, and 4, with the pressurizer on loop 1.  All of the loops have steam generators that 
include both the primary and secondary side with heat exchange structures.  The reactor 
core and bypass are modelled as two vertical pipes. The core includes three heat structures, 








All of the pumps included in the input contain realistic pump characteristic tables 
(velocity of the liquid vs pressure of the primary system) and account for pressure losses 
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through the suction and discharge lines. Control variables are included in the RELAP5-
3D model to simulate the main control logic of the primary system as extensively as 
necessary during a LOCA scenario, including the reactor control rod scram, charging flow 
initiation, sump switchover, ECCS pumps actuation, and secondary side feedwater trips 
to name a few.  This model was validated at steady-state against typical plant data.  More 
information as well as detailed nodalization diagrams are available in [16] and [15].  
 
4.2 ECCS Nodalization 
The nodalization diagram adopted for the ECCS, including charging pumps, SI 
pumps, RHR pumps, and RHR heat exchangers, is shown in Figure 4-2. Trip control 
functions were defined to switch between the phases of the injection (Safety injection, 






Figure 4-2. RELAP5-3D Safety Injection Nodalization Diagram  




The RELAP5-3D ECCS includes the following features for each train: 
- One Accumulator simulated using the accumulator component (Components 
x90). A control variable was defined in order to isolate the accumulator to 
account for special LOCA manual operation procedures. 
- One high pressure safety injection (HHSI) injecting directly to the primary 
system. The pump was modeled with a time-dependent junction (X45) where 
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a table of the liquid velocity to be injected as a function of the pressure of the 
primary system injection location was defined. 
- One low pressure safety injection (LHSI, TDJ x46) injecting into the primary 
system through the residual heat removal (RHR) exchanger. This pump was 
modeled with the same approach applied to the HHSI. 
- One RHR exchanger, connected downstream from the LHSI pump simulated 
with one pipe component (X47) for the tube side of the heat exchanger, one 
pipe component (X63) for the shell side of the heat exchanger and one heat 
structure, connected to both pipes to simulate the heat exchanger tube walls. 
Component Cooling Water (CCW) thermal-hydraulic conditions were 
imposed through a time-dependent volume (X61) and mass flow rate was 
imposed through a time-dependent junction (X62).  
The three phases of injection, namely safety injection, cold leg recirculation, and 
hot leg recirculation, are included in the model.  During the safety injection phase (from 
the ECCS actuation to the sump switchover time), the ECCS draws water from the RWST 
(volume x91) and discharges into three of the cold legs (volumes 216, 316, and 416).  
These volumes were chosen for the break location because it is most conservative to inject 
one train directly into the break volume in loop 3.  This allows for up to an entire train of 
injection to be lost by simply passing out of the break, which would be possible in the 
worst-case scenario in which the break occurs in the pipe section connected to ECCS 
injection in a real plant. The next stages of recirculation draw water from pumps located 
in the sump compartment rather than the RWST.  Control logic was defined to switch 
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between the cold leg recirculation phase, when the ECCS flow is injected into the primary 
system through the cold leg (via trip valve x49), and the hot leg recirculation phase, when 
two of the three trains (loops 2 & 3) are manually switched to the hot leg injection (via 
trip valve x48). 
The suction volume of the ECCS pumps (RWST during the safety injection phase, 
and containment sump during the recirculation cooling phase), is modeled with a time-
dependent volume (TDV x91) where the specific boundary conditions are supplied by 
RELAP tables during safety injection and by MELCOR or simulator data during CL and 
HL recirculation. The switch from the RWST to sump conditions (recirculation phase) is 
controlled by a logic control function. As mentioned before, the HHSI and LHSI were 
simulated with time-dependent junctions. To accurately simulate the pumped volumetric 
flow, the velocity in the junction is used as the reference parameter in order to account for 
the density of the injected water (coming from the RWST or sump) as it changes during 
the transient. 
4.3 Break Model Nodalization 
The DEG break was simulated using a series of three valve components, one 
connecting the two pipe sections (300-02 and 302), and one connecting each of the same 
pipes to break volumes (13 and 14), as seen in Figure 4-3. The hot leg ECCS injection for 
loop 3 enters pipe component 300-02. For a cold leg break, the pipes would be 316 and 
318-1, with cold leg injection into 316. The choice of a break location adjacent to the 
ECCS injection volume is an additional conservatism as coolant is injected in the closest 
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location to the break possible.  This, along with the correlations used at the break are 
modeled as suggested by the NRC and Idaho National Laboratory for licensing. [17] 
 
 




The break transient occurs after 300s of steady-state simulation. The trip valves 
simulating the break open instantaneously at that time, while the valve connecting the 
hot/cold leg pipes instantaneously closes. 
The break empties into two time-dependent volumes (TDV). The time-dependent 
volumes simulate the break discharge volume and contain realistic containment pressure 
profiles in response to a DEG accident obtained from MELCOR simulations.  
4.4 Blockage Simulations 
The blockage was performed according to two methodologies depending on the 
simulation. To simulate the core inlet (only) blockage, the forward k-loss coefficient on 
the core inlet junction (J545-01) was artificially increased to a sufficiently high number 
(1.0×106) to prevent flow into the core at the time of sump switchover. The k-loss 
coefficient of the bypass inlet junction was left unchanged to represent a free (unblocked) 
bypass. In order to perform this method of blockage, and to compare a core blockage 




against a simulation without blockage, the simulation was run without blockage in 
entirety, and a restart file was created and restarted at the time of sump switchover with 
the blockage changes to relevant junctions. Thus, data from simulations of this nature will 
be the exact same until SSO/Blockage time. 
For the full core and core bypass simulation, a different approach was taken as 
some coolant could still flow into the core through the lower core plate in initial 
simulations, despite high k-loss value.  This was likely because the upper head sprays also 
had significant frictional losses. Therefore, in order to determine the explicit impact of 
upper head cooling, the core blockage was modeled by removing the junctions connecting 
the lower core plate to the bypass (J545-02) and core pipes (J545-01). This method of 
blockage simulation ensures conservatism in calculations as water can only reach the core 
from the top.  Blockage for this scenario occurs 360 seconds after sump switchover.  This 
is based on the time estimated for debris to accumulate at the base of the core. A zoomed 










4.5 LOCA Holes Model Modification 
The models with LOCA holes are a modification of the standard primary model 
without LOCA holes. All dimensions, components, and simulation conditions were 
maintained and the LOCA holes have been included in the model.  In the model, these 
holes are classified by their level’s height (1 through 3), located at various spacing 
increments from the bottom of the baffle plate.  Three different input models with LOCA 
holes were produced, with one, two, or three levels of LOCA holes. 
The RELAP5-3D model simulates the core bypass and the core as two separate 
vertical pipes.  Each pipe is nodalized into 21 equally sized volumes.  For this simulation, 
the LOCA holes are modeled as cross-junctions between the two pipes, occurring at the 
midplane of nodes 6, 9, and 12, as shown in Figure 4-5.  Because the core model used in 
J 545-01 J 545-02 
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this simulation is the one-dimensional pipe component, the LOCA holes at each level were 
lumped and each cross-junction represents all of the LOCA holes that occur in a single 
axial level.  The result of this “lumping” approach is three LOCA holes with the same 
hydraulic diameter as a single hole and the total flow area equal to the sum of all of the 
holes on each level.  The height and number of levels, as well as the size and number of 
individual holes each level may vary for individual plants, and this particular arrangement 
was assumed valid for this study.  
 
 





In order to estimate the K-loss coefficient of each level of equivalent LOCA holes, 
a number of correlations have been considered.  The most basic geometry considered was 
























for flow through an orifice with sharp edges, where the LOCA hole is modeled as an 
orifice, suggesting the selection of the correlation [18] shown in Equation 6.1 valid for 













                    (Eq. 4.1) 
In Equation 6.1, F0 and F1 are the flow area of hole and the injection ambient. The 
k-loss coefficients (forward and reverse) implemented in the RELAP5-3D model were 
estimated conservatively assuming the flow area of the core and baffle regions (F1) to be 
infinitely larger compared to that of individual LOCA holes (F0). This implies that the 
ratio F0 / F1 = 0 in Equation 6.1. With this assumption the resulting k-loss coefficient was 





= 2.914      (Eq. 4.2) 
4.6 Upper Head Nodalization  
In earlier simulations, the nodalization of the upper head followed a simplified 
version of typical upper head nodalization. [14] This was not expected to impact 
simulations where coolant could still reach the core through the baffle/bypass, but it was 
necessary to ensure the nodalization accurately reflected the true upper head geometry 
when the only path for coolant to the core was through this region. In order to improve the 
realism of the model, the upper head region was re-nodalized from the simplified 
nodalization to reflect a more detailed representation of each key region. Additionally, the 
conservative assumption was made that the water must reach the top of the guide tubes to 
travel through them (i.e. no perforations in the top tube section or upper support plate as 
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mentioned previously). The simplified nodalization is shown below in Figure 4-6, with 
the updated nodalization in Figure 4-7. In the figures, the blue regions were unchanged 
between nodalizations and represent the core inlet (501), downcomer entry (501), upper 
plenum (865), and upper core plate (845). 
 
 





Figure 4-7. Detailed Upper Head Nodalization 
 
The simplified model allowed for water to reach the vessel exit through the guide 
tube section in an easier manner as the exit of the upper sprays (512) is at the same height 
as the top of the tube section (590). The detailed nodalization conservatively models these 
at discreet heights, requiring water to first fill a “dead end” volume (595), and a lower 
section of the dome (513) before entering the guide tubes (590). Additionally, passive heat 
structures were added extensively to the detailed model representing the vessel and all 
internal piping and structures (some existed previously, but only for the outer RPV). 
In the example of a Westinghouse plant found in the RELAP5 user manual 
(volume V) [14] the upper head is nodalized as seen in Figure 4-8. This example looks 
like a sort of hybrid between the simplified and detailed models. The key flow paths in the 
example model are:  
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1) Guide tubes (129) connect the upper dome (126) to the bottom of the upper core 
plate (118)  
2) The upper plenum (122) also connects the upper head/dome (126) to the vessel exit 
(120) 
3) HL/CL leakage connects (102) with (120) 
The first flow path is reflected in the detailed nodalization, but the tubes open into 
the vessel exit (upper plenum) rather than the bottom of the upper core plate. The detailed 
model is more realistic (with given assumptions) than the example given because of the 
large number of perforations in the guide tubes in the vessel exit section as well as the 
larger flow area of the perforations relative to the smaller flow area in the tubes 
themselves. This means that once coolant passes below the upper support plate, it can be 
considered as unrestricted, resulting in a more conservative and realistic model than one 
which directs all guide tube flow directly to the top of the core. Additionally, control rods 
in the inserted configuration (as it would be during a shutdown) at the base of the guide 
tubes may restrict flow in that region, further compounding uncertainty. 
The second flow path was reflected in the simplified nodalization as pipe 590. To 
ensure conservatism in calculations, as well as assess the impact on cooling from the guide 
tubes specifically, the new nodalization only has flow from the upper dome to the vessel 
exit through the guide tubes. This is realistic because some reactor designs may not have 
additional flow paths through the upper support plate.  
The third flow path, HL/CL leakage has significant pressure loss terms and a very 
small flow area as it is a designed leak, as previously mentioned. Due to uncertainty in 
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performance or availability of this flow path during an accident scenario with possible 
thermal swelling, it is not modeled. It is more conservative to remove it as it provides a 
flow path at the same elevation as the upper plenum.   
 
 
Figure 4-8. RELAP Manual Upper Head Nodalization for Westinghouse PWR [13] 
 
4.7 General Simulation Procedure 
All transient simulations have been preceded by a steady-state simulation, to best 
replicate the initial conditions of the nuclear power plant before the break. The transients 
begin with 300 seconds of null-transient, to insure stabilization of the initial conditions of 
the transient simulations.  
At 300 seconds, the DEG break is initiated according to the procedure previously 
described.  The sump switchover trip time varies depending on break size and ECCS 
actuation, but is very similar for DEG breaks in either leg. The blockage trip is initiated 
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either at the time of SSO or is delayed by a few minutes according to time it would take 
to for debris to sufficiently accumulate. Regardless of specific timing, the blockage is full 
and instantaneous once triggered. The simulation proceeds through long term cooling flow 
recirculation according to the ECCS procedure described in Section 4.2, with HLSO 
occurring at a fixed time, approximately five and a half hours after the break, regardless 
of break size. After the HLSO, the simulation will continue to run in this actuation until 
reaching quasi-steady state. This is summarized in Table 4-1. 
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5. SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
When evaluating simulation results, the most important safety parameter for any 
simulation is core coolability. There are a number of factors that play into core coolability, 
but the key indicators are peak cladding temperature (PCT) and coolant inventory.  
Peak cladding temperatures are measured in RELAP heat structures, and are pulled 
directly from output data. The safety limit of PCT of interest to this study is 1478K due to 
cladding oxidation limits. It should be noted that regulatory limits may be lower, 
especially during long term cooling.   
Coolant inventory is most easily examined through the Core Collapsed Liquid 
Level (CLL). CLL is a method of looking at overall void fraction in a region, as coolant 
is often dispersed and not entirely liquid when the core depressurizes in an accident 
scenario. Core CLL is calculated from the RELAP liquid fraction (volumetric liquid 
fraction) multiplied by the height of each node. The nodes across the core are then summed 
and a representative height of liquid vs vapor for the entire core is available as a parameter 
of interest. CLL can be expressed mathematically according to the following formula: 
CLL = ∑𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒=1
21 (heightnode ∙ αnode)   (Eq. 5.1) 
Core collapsed liquid level is calculated from the liquid fraction in each of the core’s 21 
nodes multiplied by the height of each node.  Additionally, flow patterns in the primary 
system are important for explaining system behavior and coolant availability, and integral 
mass flow shows these flow patterns as a trend, making it especially useful. Other 
parameters may be of interest to specific scenarios and will be discussed as relevant. 
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5.1 Cold Leg DEG Break with Core Inlet Blockage 
The most severe scenario to consider under the premise of this study would be a 
double-ended guillotine break in the cold leg. Obviously the DEG break is the largest size 
possible, which allows for rapid blowdown and uninhibited exit of coolant through the 
break during safety injection. The cold leg break is more severe than the hot leg break as 
coolant is not forced to go through the RPV before exiting the break. This may also mean 
debris is not forced through the core, but a sufficient amount of debris reaching the lower 
core to induce inlet blockage is assumed for the purposes of this study. It qualitatively 
results in an almost entirely hydrostatically driven process of coolant supply which is 
confirmed quantitatively. 
To determine impact of LOCA holes as an alternative flow path, a series of input 
models were prepared, one without LOCA holes, and three with LOCA holes, including 
one level, two levels, and three levels of LOCA holes. The LOCA holes start at the bottom 
as depicted by Figure 4-5, such that the single LOCA hole model is the lowest hole and 
the two LOCA hole model has the lower two holes. The standard simulation procedure 
was carried out for each input model, summarized in Table 5-1 with a color scheme to 
assist in identifying data in this section. For simulations without core blockage, the key 
core coolability parameters are essentially indistinguishable, therefore only the model 















In the first simulation performed, the two CL DEG LOCA transients were 
performed on the model without LOCA holes, one with core blockage at the sump 
switchover and one without. For the blockage simulation, the core inlet was 
instantaneously blocked as described in the previous section.  After blockage occurs the 
maximum peak cladding temperature rapidly exceeded the safety limit. Figure 5-1 shows 
this comparison of two runs of the model without LOCA holes near the sump switchover 
time. Later simulation times are not of direct relevance to results as the simulation is 
considered over if the safety margins are exceeded. The HLSO would also allow water to 
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Figure 5-1. Maximum Peak Cladding Temperature (Base Case and Core Blockage 




As mentioned in Section 3.2, In a cold leg DEG core blockage transient scenario 
the supply of coolant to the core is primarily determined by the hydrostatic head between 
the cold leg and the top of the core. Before blockage, the hydrostatic head must overcome 
the frictional losses through the flow path between the ECCS injection location (cold leg) 
and the top of the core, including the inlet nozzle, downcomer, and lower core plates.  Due 
to the lower pressure drop between the injection point and the break, the injected water is 
preferentially directed toward the break (either directly out from loop 3, or into the annular 
vessel entrance region then out the broken leg from loops 2 and 4), while a relatively small 
fraction goes through the downcomer. Before the break this is usually enough to replace 
the water evaporating in the core, however after the blockage, the flow area is reduced and 
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the frictional losses are higher as flow must pass through the bypass (including the 
horizontal former plates) to reach the top of the core.  
Figure 5-2 gives a visual representation of this phenomena. This may explain the 
lack of core coolability and the subsequent increase of the cladding temperature shown in 








Due to height of the cold leg, a significant amount water is not expected to pass 
through the upper head in a cold leg DEG break. Because the bypass is therefore the only 
realistic route during a CL break for cooling water to take in the event of a core inlet 
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blockage, as explained in section 3.2, it would be expected that the LOCA holes would 
provide additional flow paths to the core and positively affect the core coolability under 
core blockage conditions.  Therefore, adding this feature to the model and investigating 
its effects is very important to GSI-191 research as well as model realism.  
The addition of LOCA holes is expected to increase the supply of coolant to the 
core through holes located at lower elevations as the effective hydrostatic head is higher 









The comparison of peak cladding temperature for the core blockage simulations 
with and without the LOCA holes is shown in Figure 5-4. The effect of the addition of 
LOCA holes in the transient simulation showed an improvement of the core coolability, 




Figure 5-4. Maximum Peak Cladding Temperature (Core Blockage with and 




The impact of the addition of LOCA holes is so substantial, that even a single row 
of holes at the lowest elevation is predicted by the simulation to be sufficient to prevent 
cladding from exceeding failure limits.  The comparison of all three input models with 
LOCA holes is shown in Figure 5-5 (with a zoomed temperature scale to better show 
differences). The comparison of the single LOCA hole model is compared to the results 
without blockage (with the same temperature scale) in Figure 5-6 and shows that while 
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there are minor cladding temperature spikes, the presence of a single level of LOCA holes 





Figure 5-5. Maximum Peak Cladding Temperature (Core Blockage for All Three 









Figure 5-6. Maximum Peak Cladding Temperature (Core Blockage for 1 Level of 




The core collapsed liquid level is shown in Figure 5-7.  The effect of the LOCA 
holes is shown as a higher core liquid level (blue) than the simulation without LOCA holes 
(red).  The simulation with LOCA holes clearly has a lower total liquid volume than a 
simulation without blockage (green), but the amount of liquid is sufficient to keep 
maintain an adequate heat removal rate. Figure 5-8 shows the same data, but for the model 
with just one LOCA hole. The similarities in liquid level between the one and three LOCA 
hole models and the impact of a single level of LOCA holes on PCT indicates that the 
lowest height LOCA hole may be the most impactful on core coolability, regardless of 






Figure 5-7. Core Collapsed Liquid Level (Unblocked Core and Core Blockage 






Figure 5-8. Core Collapsed Liquid Level (Unblocked Core and Core Blockage 




Bypass integral flow mass, shown in Figure 5-9, represents the total mass of the 
flow through bypass region over time, with data artificially zeroed at each trip (0s and 
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1770s).  Examining core bypass flow is the most effective way to see if the coolant has 
the opportunity to reach the core, as the bypass is the dominant flow path for coolant to 
reach the blocked core. From 0-300 seconds, it is clear a great deal of coolant is forced 
through the bypass during normal, steady operation. This gives some scale for subsequent 
flow. After the break, there is little relative flow in through the bypass. After the core 
blockage time, the results showed a net increase in the mass flowing through the bypass 
inlet as an effect of the presence of the LOCA holes, whilst in the model without the LOCA 









In summary, cladding temperature was predicted to increase in the core blockage 
scenario if LOCA holes are not accounted for, due to a substantial decrease of the water 
supplied to the core.  The effect of LOCA holes in improving core coolability by 
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increasing coolant supply to the core through the bypass was predicted by the simulations.  
The simulation also predicted that even a single level of LOCA holes at the lowest height 
was sufficient to cool the core for extended periods of time.   
While there are not yet other studies or simulations with which to compare the 
validity of the simulation results with the addition of LOCA holes, the base model has 
been thoroughly vetted and the LOCA holes were added in a valid manner, therefore, the 
results should be considered valid.  This work shows the importance of modeling plant 
specific features when performing best-estimate calculations to support the GSI-191 
research and shows the degree of impact a single design feature may have on core 
coolability.   
5.2 Hot Leg DEG Break with Full Core/Bypass Blockage 
While a cold leg DEG was determined to be the most severe scenario, it was not 
chosen for the full core and bypass blockage due to a number of factors. First and foremost, 
the cladding reaches a failure limit in a cold leg DEG with full blockage regardless of 
nodalization as coolant is initially injected into the cold legs and therefore preferentially 
flows out of the break. Second, due to the ECCS injecting into the cold leg before HLSO, 
a hot leg break may force more debris down the downcomer and through the core than a 
cold leg break which could result in more significant blockage. While obviously 
conservative in general, this makes the full core and core bypass scenario more likely to 
occur with a hot leg break. 
During a hot leg break with full core blockage, the injected coolant has one of two 
(considered) paths to exit the primary through the break:  
 
44 
1) By passing through the upper head sprays, through the guide tubes, and exiting the 
upper plenum via the broken loop’s HL nozzle 
2) By filling a Steam Generator (SG) and effectively reversing the normal coolant flow 
path. This can happen according to two subpaths:  
a. If the broken loop is refilled in this manner, coolant can directly exit over 
the U-tubes an through the break; 
b. Otherwise, if it fills a non-broken SG, it must pass over the U-tubes and 
through the upper plenum still, and exit the upper plenum via the broken 
loop’s HL nozzle. 
This is due to safety injection actuation before the HLSO, where all three SI trains are 
injecting into the cold leg. Pushed by the SI pump head, which operates at an inverse to 
primary pressure, that is, it injects a larger volume of coolant in response to lower primary 
pressures, there is sufficient force in this configuration for either scenario to occur. 
However, because the elevation of the steam generator is much higher than the upper head 
sprays, coolant is at least initially directed through the sprays after core/bypass blockage.  
As noted in Section 4.6 the initial model of the upper head was rather simplistic, 
but was considered sufficient as the upper head flows were not expected to have a 
significant impact on core coolability in a cold leg break or hot leg break with free bypass. 
However, examining a hot leg break under the scenario of full core/bypass blockage 
requires accurate modeling as it becomes a very important flow path. The simplistic model 
showed that the core survived, but it allowed flow to immediately pass into the upper 
plenum from the sprays due to not accounting for key upper head elevations. Therefore, 
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core survivability under the more realistic, more conservative model was of interest and a 
comparison with the simplistic model was necessary. 
The first figure of merit when examining the differences between the models was 
Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT). The results from the new design showed that the peak 
cladding temperatures were not significantly different from the reference, and the core 
was kept well below safety limits during the full HL DEG break and blockage transient. 
There is a “stepped” temperature increase for both models, thanks to the delay of 360s 
after the sump switchover before the blockage occurs, resulting in the first jump from 
warmer sump recirculation water, and 360 seconds later, another increase due to the 









As Figure 5-11 shows, the average Core CLL is very similar for both models, with 
less fluctuation from the newer model. The reduction in fluctuation is primarily due to the 
more constricted and realistic geometry, which does not permit rapid movement of large 








The integral flow plot in Figure 5-12 is “zeroed” artificially before the break and 
again at the core blockage to aid in distinguishing the flow patterns at each stage of the 
transient. Positive slopes on the plot indicate flow in the marked direction, while negative 










The results make sense qualitatively as the steep, positive slopes immediately after 
the break (300-320s) in the Guide Tubes to Upper Plenum/Vessel Exit direction indicate 
that both upper head volumes are emptying, mostly through that preferential and larger 
flow area (rather than reverse flow through the spray nozzles) with the simplified model 
emptying more because of the lack of the “dead volume” below spray nozzle height. When 
the two slopes diverge (positive guide tube to plenum, negative CL inlet to spray flows), 
the upper head area is emptying (and conversely filling when they converge), which can 
be confirmed by examining the liquid fraction of the total upper head volumes (volumes 
above 501/865 in Figures Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7). The reference case tends to exhibit 
greater degrees of emptying as it has a larger flow area across the upper support plate.  
After the core blockage, a strong positive slope is expected and seen, as this becomes the 
only path for water to exit the vessel. 
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The liquid fraction plotted against integral flow in Figure 5-13 confirms the 
expectations of the initial loss of coolant in the upper head immediately after the break. 
Additionally, the expected head emptying when integral flows diverge is confirmed. Some 
clear examples of this behavior are marked in Figure 5-14, Figure 5-15, and Figure 5-16, 










Figure 5-14. Flow and Void Behavior During Initial Break and Subsequent Rapid 
















In considering the other coolant flow path, via steam generator refill, there are a 
number of factors that may influence if a steam generator refills, which steam generator 
refills if this occurs, and how quickly after the blockage it will refill if such behavior 
occurs. Due to the large number of factors that play a role in this behavior, and the 
difficulty in conducting and validating a separate effects test specifically for SG Refill, 
this study does not consider it in detail. The data obtained in this study indicates that SG 
refills may have no significant effect on the core coolability in a HL DEG core/bypass 
blockage, which is somewhat reassuring as it essentially shows safety margins could 
potentially be maintained with the loss of a portion of ECCS injection, which was already 
somewhat confirmed in the CL break as the break location allowed an entire train of 
injection to pass directly out of the break. 
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Overall the more realistically nodalized model seems to better represents expected 
behavior by taking into account geometrical effects on flow paths and restrictions due to 
upper head internal components. The results showed that the more realistic geometry had 
little effect on overall core coolability, with the peak cladding temperature remaining well 
below safety limits in both cases. This is reassuring in the case of an accident where this 







Under some of the most severe possible scenarios for debris penetration, core 
coolability is still possible due to the numerous flow paths for coolant to reach the core. 
This study demonstrated the importance of ensuring models accurately reflect a plant’s 
specific features such as LOCA holes, a single feature which may prove to be the 
difference in surviving a cold leg DEG under hypothetical core blockage.  The changes 
made to emphasize realism and ensure conservatism in the upper head showed that under 
some of the most conservative modelling assumptions, core coolability could be 
maintained during a hot leg DEG break with full core and bypass blockage.   
This work represents significant contribution towards the risk-informed closure of 
GSI-191. While the probabilistic analyses may show this sort of large break accident and 
further conditions for this scenario to occur to the degree postulated as unlikely to occur, 
they represent bounding conditions and add deterministic data in support of problem 
analysis. The ability to iterate over varying predicted break sizes and blockage 
configurations in RELAP shows a cooperation between probabilistic and deterministic 
calculation methods. 
This thesis also represents the framework for thermal hydraulic safety analysis 
established by Texas A&M University to address this regulatory burden for typical 
Westinghouse four-loop PWRs. RELAP is a well-documented and NRC approved code. 
The plant specific features, such as ECCS configuration, presence of LOCA holes, 
structural upper head design can be easily modified and accident components such as 
break size, location, and blockage can be varied according to needs. If this general 
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methodology is approved by the NRC, it can be applied to many similar plants, where, if 
survivability of severe accidents and blockages is ensured, may help close the GSI-191 
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